Elections constitute the ultimate ground of struggle between competing political actors. The design of electoral systems, for its part, is as important as the elections themselves. In other words the rules of the game are as important as the game itself. This book on decision-making in post-1945 Turkish political history with a particular focus on electoral systems, contributes to the academic debate between Rational Choice Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism over the determinants of institutional design. The main question of the book is ‘what explains the electoral system choices in multi-party Turkey?’. Readers are welcome to look inside for the answer.
Künye
Kitabın Adı: |
Electoral Systems in Turkey |
Yazan: |
|
Dizi Adı: |
History - 202 |
Baskı Adedi: |
100 |
Yayın Yılı: |
2017 |
Sayfa: |
268 |
Ebat: |
13.5 x 21 cm. |
Kağıt: |
Enzo 70 gr. |
Kapak: |
Bora Gürsoy |
Cilt/Kapak: |
250 gr. Mat, Amerikan Bristol, 4 renk |
ISBN/Barkod: |
978-605-2380-18-5 |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The research question and relevance of the research
Theoretical framework and structure of the book
Methodology
The selection of the case study method
What cases to research and why?
The means of research
CHAPTER TWO
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW
Majoritarian systems
Proportional Representation (PR) systems
Mixed systems
Elements related to election systems other than formulae
Consequences of election systems
The degree of proportionality of different electoral systems
The number of parties in parliament
The degree to which the parliament is socially representative
Representation of women
Representation of minorities
Electoral systems in Turkey: Background and overview
CHAPTER THREE
DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS: THE THEORY
Institutions: A concise overview
What are institutions?
What are the institutions for?
What is the institutional design (for)?
The rational choice institutionalism vs. historical institutionalism debate and the design of electoral institutions
The sub-questions of the research
CHAPTER FOUR
CASE ONE: THE PUZZLE OF THE RETENTION OF THE PLURALITY SYSTEM BEFORE THE 1950 GENERAL ELECTION
Observable implications of the theoretical models
The 1950 case: The analysis
CHAPTER FIVE
CASE TWO: THE ADOPTION OF THE D'HONDT SYSTEM WITH DISTRICT THRESHOLD IN 1961
Observable implications of the theoretical models
The 1961 case: The analysis
CHAPTER SIX
CASE THREE: THE ADOPTION OF THE 'NATIONAL REMAINDER' SYSTEM IN 1965
Observable implications of the theoretical models
The 1965 case: The analysis
CHAPTER SEVEN
CASE FOUR: THE ADOPTION OF THE D'HONDT SYSTEM IN 1968
Observable implications of the theoretical models
The 1968 case: The analysis
CHAPTER EIGHT
CASE FIVE: THE ADOPTION OF THE D'HONDT SYSTEM WITH DOUBLE THRESHOLD IN 1983
Observable implications of the theoretical models
The 1983 case: The analysis
CHAPTER NINE
CASE SIX: THE ADOPTION OF THE D'HONDT SYSTEM WITH DOUBLE THRESHOLD AND QUOTA IN 1987
Observable implications of the theoretical models
The 1987 case: The analysis
CHAPTER TEN
CASE SEVEN: THE ADOPTION OF THE D'HONDT SYSTEMWITHOUT DISTRICT THRESHOLD AND QUOTA IN 1995
Observable implications of the theoretical models
The 1995 case: The analysis
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CASE EIGHT: THE PUZZLE OF THE RETENTION OF THE TEN PER CENT NATIONAL THRESHOLD BEFORE THE 2002 GENERAL ELECTION
Observable implications of the theoretical models
The 2002 case: The analysis
CHAPTER TWELVE CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
